the withdrawal of the United States from the convention in 1984, Canada became the only art-acquiring signatory. See Merryman, supra note 15, and accompanying text. The other art-acquiring nations-which include England, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland-still have not become members. Id. at 843. For a more thorough discussion of the UNESCO Convention, see supra note 15.
17 For a more detailed discussion of the inadequacies of the UNESCO Convention, see Note, Toward Establishing an International Tribunal 1881, 1893 (1985) . the ineffectiveness of both unilateral and multilateral attempts to protect cultural property, leaves art owners in a precarious position. Once art objects are stolen, owners often have no other alternative but to wait for their property to resurface on the art market. 1 8 Even if stolen art objects reappear, owners are not necessarily guaranteed the return of their property.
United States courts increasingly face the difficult task of evaluating the claims of original owners of art objects against subsequent bona fide purchasers of such objects.' 9 In order to reach this issue, courts have had to address the preliminary issue of whether the applicable statute of limitations has terminated the original owner's right to bring an action to recover his or her stolen property. Due to the difficulty and delay in recovering stolen art, courts have been reluctant to hold that the applicable statute of limitations bars a theft victim's right to recover his or her property. Over the years, courts have employed several distinct doctrines to aid their determinations of whether an original owner can bring suit, beyond the applicable limitations period, against a bona fide purchaser of his or her stolen art. 20 Early doctrines focused on the actions of subsequent purchasers or arbitrary events. 2 1 Conversely, today's reigning doctrine, the discovery rule, focuses solely on the original owner's actions to determine whether such an owner can bring a claim.
2
This Comment examines the prior doctrines, including the statute of limitations bar, the adverse possession doctrine, and the demand and refusal rule, employed by courts to determine whether original owners of stolen art can bring suit against subsequent bona 18 Stolen art typically filters into otherwise legitimate markets. As ex-art-squad detective Robert Volpe explained, " [u] nless you (the thief) know or have ties to the legitimate market, you won't be able to make a profit." Esterow, supra note 12, at 135.
19 See, e.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987 Cir. ), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 Cir. (1988 ; Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989 ), aft'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990 ; O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980); Porter v. Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979) , aft 'd, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105, 421 N.E.2d 500 (1981); Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dept. 1964 ), on remand, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966 , modified on other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dept. 1967) , modification rev 'd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 246 N.E.2d 742 (1969) .
20 See, e.g., Rabinof v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 830 (1971) Keeffe, 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (discovery rule) .
21 For a thorough discussion of the adverse possession doctrine and the demand and refusal rule, see infra notes 48-83 and accompanying text.
22 For a thorough discussion of the discovery rule, see infra notes 84-127 and accompanying text.
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fide purchasers regardless of the expiration of the applicable limitations period. This Comment notes the reasons why these doctrines are becoming obsolete. It also discusses the evolution and application of today's reigning doctrine, the discovery rule.
This Comment recognizes that, at first glance, the discovery rule appears to provide the most equitable method for resolving whether original owners can bring suit to recover their stolen property beyond the expiration of the limitations period. Nevertheless, this Comment determines that the discovery rule places a tremendous burden on present possessors and original owners, because the courts have not established objective standards of conduct for possessors and owners to follow. Moreover, this Comment argues that the current doctrine promotes an inefficient method for determining whether an individual may bring a legal claim once the limitations period expires. This Comment also argues that the current method fails to discourage art theft effectively. Finally, this Comment argues that the implementation of the discovery rule creates an irreconcilable conflict with the previously-established legal notion that a thief does not obtain good title to stolen property.
Therefore, given the shortcomings of the discovery rule, this Comment concludes that courts must re-evaluate their use of this doctrine. Rather than employing the doctrine in its present form, courts should amend the discovery rule to establish a more efficient and more equitable rule which places the burden of action equally upon the original owner and the subsequent purchaser of stolen art.
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The civil action of replevin constitutes the primary means of securing a stolen painting's return from a bona fide purchaser. 23 As Another common method of securing the return of property is the tort action of conversion. Conversion protects owners from major interferences with their chattel or with their rights to said chattel. To determine the severity of the interference and whether justice requires the defendant to pay full value for the chattel under a forced judicial sale, courts consider all the relevant factors of a case, including: the extent and duration of the defendant's exercise of control over the chattel; the defendant's good faith or bad intention; the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the plaintiff's right of control; the harm done to the chattel; and the expense and inconvenience caused to the plaintiff.
1991]
with all civil actions, the requirement that the original owner file his or her claim within the established statute of limitations period restricts this right. 24 As a general rule, the expiration of the established limitations period precludes the original owner's right to sue the subsequent bona fide purchaser of his or her stolen property in replevin, and vests ownership status in that bona fide purchaser. 2 5 To judge if a statute of limitations bars a particular claim, one must understand the policy goals behind both the limitation and the accrual of the cause of action, which is the event that marks the time when the limitations period begins to run. Statutes of limitations do not intend either to shield wrongdoers or to provide them with peace of mind concerning potential liability. 26 Rather, the rationale behind statutes of limitations is the realization that the passage of time can make the prosecution of delayed claims burdensome and unfair. 2 7 A limitations period prevents unfairness to a defendant by relieving her of the burden of defending lawsuits after she has enjoyed a substantial period of repose and during which time evidence may have been lost, destroyed or manufactured, memories may have faded, and important witnesses may have died or disappeared. 2 8 Statutes of limitations also serve a punitive function by depriving a plaintiff of the right to sue if he or she does not bring a claim promptly to court. 29 Part of the rationalization for this function rests upon the image of the prospective plaintiff as a "sleeping claimant" who intentionally or negligently postpones bringing an action. 3 Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 6 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1975); Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 336 A.2d 555, 560 (R.I. 1976) Courts generally have preferred to avoid the statute of limitation bar by employing the second method. This method consists of judicial manipulation of the definition of the "accrual" of a cause of action. 3 9 Because legislatures often have left this matter undecided, 40 in cases where a plaintiff legitimately is ignorant of his or her right to sue, courts have altered the definition of the accrual of a cause of action. In such cases, courts have defined the accrual of a cause of action as the time of its discovery, rather than the traditionally accepted standard that the cause of action accrues upon the commission of the tortious act. Like most replevin actions, the cause of action for the recovery of stolen art traditionally accrued at the time of the wrongful taking, and not upon the discovery of the identity of the party in possession of the property. However, due to the growing recognition of the difficulty of discovering who possesses stolen property and the ease with which individuals can hide property, the judiciary has manipulated the statute of limitations bar to expand plaintiffs' rights to bring such claims beyond the expiration of the applicable limitations 37 Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1132. This method of creating an exception to statutes of limitation focuses on the policy of allowing a potential plaintiff to bring an action when, through no fault of his or her own, the plaintiff has been kept ignorant of his or her ability to sue. In such cases, courts often conclude that the obvious injustice to the plaintiff outweighs the broader policy considerations favoring the defendant.
38 Id. at 1132-33. 39 See, e.g., Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 NJ. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961) .
40 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 41 In Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court followed this line of reasoning. 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970) . In Lipsey, the plaintiff brought an action against her doctor, who had failed to diagnose properly her excised tumor as malignant. Id. After removing the plaintiff's arm, shoulder, and breast for malignancies, the doctor reexamined his original biopsy and discovered the error that he had made in diagnosing the biopsy three years before. Id. at 34-35, 262 N.E.2d at 452. In the plaintiff's subsequent malpractice action, the court focused upon the doctor's defense that the plaintiff had not brought her action within the two year limitation period because the statute began to run from the time of the alleged negligence. Id. at 37, 262 N.E.2d at 453. The court disagreed with the defendant's argument and decided that, in medical malpractice cases, the cause of action accrued when the harmed individual learned of her injury or reasonably should have learned of it. Id. at 39, 262 N.E.2d at 455. By reaching this conclusion, the court joined "a 'wave of decisions' favoring [this] rule of time of discovery." Id. at 40, 262 N.E.2d at 455 (citations omitted). See also Fernandi, 35 NJ. at 451, 173 A.2d at 286 (limitation period began to run when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know about the foreign object left in her body during surgery and the existence of a cause of action based upon the object's presence).
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period. 4 2 Judicial treatment of this conflict between the statute of limitation bar and the difficulty of locating stolen property has not been uniform. Many courts have expanded plaintiffs' rights to bring actions by implying that knowledge of who possesses one's art begins the accrual period. 43 Other courts have expanded plaintiffs' rights by employing judicially-created doctrines in order to achieve equitable results. Such courts have granted or denied relief based upon uneven applications of corollary doctrines such as fraudulent concealment, 4 4 adverse possession, 45 the demand and refusal rule, 4 6 and, most recently, the discovery rule.
III. COROLLARY DOCTRINES

A. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In addition to relying upon the expiration of the statute of limitations, courts have considered the transfer of title to property via the doctrine of adverse possession when determining whether an original owner can bring legal action to recover stolen property.
48
The historical doctrine of disseisin explains the origin of this usage of adverse possession. 49 Traditionally, before the statute of limitation expired, the possessor had the property and the right to keep it unless the original owner claimed it. Hence, the only imperfection in the possessor's right to retain that property was the original owner's right to repossess it. Once the running of the limitation period removed this imperfection, the possessor had good title to the property for all purposes. 50 At first glance, one might think that the statute of limitations and the adverse possession doctrine merely work together to determine whether an owner can bring an action to recover his stolen property from a subsequent purchaser. Indeed, the two doctrines 49 Under the doctrine of disseisin, courts treated a wrongful possessor, as long as her possession continued, as the owner, and the dispossessed occupant was considered merely to have a personal right to attempt to recapture his property. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 NJ. 478, 500, 416 A.2d 862, 874 (1980) (quoting R. BROWN, supra note 23, at 34). REV. 1122 REV. , 1123 REV. (1984 (footnotes omitted). Actual possession requires that the possessor demonstrate the ability to control the property in question and the intent to exclude others from such control. Open and notorious possession requires that one's possession be so conspicuous that this possession generally is known to the public. Exclusive possession requires that the possessor holds possession of the property for himself and/or that he maintains sole dominion over the property and its appropriation for his sole use and benefit. Continuous possession requires that the possessor maintain the uninterrupted possession of the property for the full period designated by the pertinent statute of limitations. Finally, hostile possession requires that the possessor intend to dispossess the true owner and the rest of the world. Thus, while the statute of limitation relies upon an arbitrary time period to determine whether an owner can bring suit to recover his stolen property from a subsequent purchaser, adverse possession focuses upon the possessor's fulfillment of several factors demonstrating the character of his possession. This focus better protects original owners, because the doctrine places more stringent requirements on subsequent possessors. 57 Traditionally, the doctrine of adverse possession applied to claims involving the acquisition of titles to land. 58 However, it also is well-settled that a possessor may acquire title to chattels by adverse possession. 59 Thus, given the advantages of the adverse possession doctrine over the statute of limitation and the doctrine's applicability to chattels, the judiciary has employed the adverse possession doctrine when addressing claims by original owners against subsequent possessors of their chattels.
60
While the application of the adverse possession doctrine to chattels treats owners more fairly than a similar application of the statute of limitations, its application still risks great injustice and arbitrariness. An inherent problem with many kinds of personal property is that it always is debatable whether an individual has openly, visibly, and notoriously possessed such property. 6 1 This problem is particularly acute with respect to works of art. Like many types of 55 Id at 843. 56 Id. Rabinof's use of the violin was not hostile, because the owner originally gave him permission to use it. Id. at 842. For an explanation of the requirements of adverse possession, see infra note 57. 57 Under adverse possession, the possessor must act deliberately to obtain permanent possession of the property rather than passively awaiting the passage of the arbitrary time limit designated by the statute of limitation. Furthermore, adverse possession can lengthen the limitations period by introducing additional elements to the cause of action which the possessor must demonstrate before the action can accrue. 
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personal property, one can readily move and easily conceal art objects. Therefore, either an original owner must overcome the practically insurmountable task of attempting to locate his stolen property, which may be displayed privately, or the present possessor, to prove open and notorious possession, must publicly display the art object in question. Given this inherent problem, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the need to replace the adverse possession doctrine in O 'Keeffe v. Snyder. 62 In that case, the defendant displayed O'Keeffe's paintings in his home. 6 3 Rather than attempting to manipulate the standard for determining whether the defendant's possession of the paintings was sufficiently open and notorious under the adverse possession doctrine, the court adopted a new rule focusing on the plaintiff's actions. 64 Many courts have followed O'Keeffe and dispensed with the adverse possession doctrine. 6 5 These courts have employed other judicially-created doctrines to determine whether an original owner can bring an action against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for the recovery of his stolen property.
B. THE DEMAND AND REFUSAL DOCTRINE
Unsatisfied with the adverse possession doctrine's ability to curb the potential injustice of a mechanical application of the statute of limitations bar, some courts have relied upon the judicially-created demand and refusal rule to measure the accrual time of a cause of action. Under this doctrine, to commence an action to recover stolen property from a bona fide purchaser, an original owner must prove that the purchaser refused, upon demand, to return the prop- O'Keeffe argues that nothing short of public display should be sufficient to alert the true owner and start the statute running. Although there is merit in that contention from the perspective of the original owner, the effect is to impose a heavy burden on the purchasers of paintings who wish to enjoy the paintings in the privacy of their homes. 
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66
Until the original owner demands the return of her property, one cannot consider the innocent purchaser's possession wrongful or unlawful. Since the purchaser has had no notice of a claim, the demand serves to establish that the purchaser wrongfully has retained the original owner's property. 6 7 Informing the purchaser of the defect in the title affords the purchaser the opportunity to return the property to the original owner before a court holds him liable. 68 Menzel v. List 6 9 constitutes the quintessential example of the judiciary's use of the demand and refusal rule in its attempt to manipulate the accrual time of the applicable statute of limitations. In Menzel, the plaintiff and her husband left a painting by renowned artist Marc Chagall in their apartment in Brussels when they fled from the Nazis in 1941.70 The plaintiff subsequently settled in the United States, and once the war ended, began searching for the painting. 7 ' She finally located it in the defendant's possession in 1962. The plaintiff demanded its return, the defendant refused, and the plaintiff then filed an action for replevin. As one of his five defenses, the defendant claimed that the statute of limitations for the plaintiff's action had expired, because fourteen years had passed between the time when the plaintiff asserted that the Nazis had stolen the painting and the time when the defendant bought the painting. 73 The court quickly dispensed with this defense, stating that for actions in replevin, as well as in conversion, the cause of action against a bona fide purchaser arose upon the defendant's refusal to convey the chattel on demand, rather than upon the stealing or the taking of that chattel. 74 Courts have considered such a demand for the return of stolen property a substantive, rather than a procedural, part of the cause of action. 75 This distinction has played a particularly important role in the determination of whether an owner can bring a suit to recover stolen property, because it assures that the limitations period will 
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not begin to run until the owner actually demands that the possessor return the property. 76 Courts consider demands procedural when the demand constitutes a condition for bringing the action but not an essential part of the action. 7 7 Unlike substantive demands, procedural demands provide for the accrual of the cause of action at "the time the right to make the demand is complete." 7 Hence, considering the demand a substantive part of the action extends the period before the accrual of the action from the time when the object is stolen to the time when the owner demands its return. The Menzel court's determination that such a demand for the return of an art object constituted a substantive part of the cause of action has served as the basis for similar determinations in later proceedings. For example, citing Menzel, the Second Circuit recognized that the original owner of a stolen painting by Claude Monet had the undisputable duty, among other duties, to demand its return before the court would toll the applicable statute of limitations.
79
The Menzel courts's demand and refusal rule better protects the interests of original owners than the adverse possession doctrine, because owners have the opportunity to take action to recover their stolen property. Yet, this rule also has met with a storm of criticism due to its harsh treatment of innocent purchasers. Principally, the Menzel doctrine "reduces the repose of innocent purchasers to a nullity" by allowing aggrieved owners to bring causes of action, regardless of the passage of the statute of limitations' designated time limit, as long as the owner meets the demand requirement. 8 0 Moreover, if the possessor is a wrongful taker or a purchaser with knowledge, courts should not require a demand, because the possessor already has notice of his wrongful retention of the original owner's property. 8 1 Because the demand requirement in this instance would not constitute a substantive part of the cause of action, the statute of limitations presumably would begin running immediately in favor of the purchaser upon his taking possession of the chattel. Thus, the demand and refusal rule could lead to the anomalous result of Under this rubric, courts have claimed that the discovery rule functions as a balancing test between the defendant's legitimate aims of repose 87 and the hardship to the plaintiff of having a claim barred even though she reasonably could not have known that she had a claim until after the limitations period expired. 88 To satisfy 82 Id.; see also DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108 (delay of original owner's demand also delays accrual of the cause of action; thus, the good faith purchaser will remain exposed to suit long after an action against a thief or a bad faith purchaser would be time barred). D.N.Y. 1976) . In Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, the Southern District of New York carried its argument against the application of the demand and refusal rule beyond such policy considerations. The court never actually reached the statute of limitations issue, because it dismissed the case on other grounds. However, in dicta, the court noted certain statutory language apparently overlooked by the Menzel court, which provided that courts must measure the limitations period from the time when the right to make a demand was completed. The Menzel court, on the other hand, held that the cause of action accrued when the plaintiff demanded the return of his property and the defendant refused.
Courts also have disapproved of the demand and refusal doctrine because it encourages possessors to conceal art objects. this equitable obligation, courts have considered all aspects of a case relevant to the determination of the accrual time. Hence, advocates of the discovery rule claim that the meaning of "due diligence" and its application have varied according to the facts of each case. 8 9 The party claiming the indulgence of the rule traditionally has borne the burden of proving such relevant factors and circumstances as: the nature of the alleged injury, the availability of witnesses and written evidence, the length of time that has elapsed since the alleged wrongdoing, whether the delay has been to any extent deliberate or intentional, [and] whether the delay may be said to have peculiarly or unusually prejudiced the defendant. 9 0
The discovery rule first appeared in the medical malpractice area in 1917, 9 1 but it was not considered a potent theory until its adoption by the California Supreme Court in 1936.92 In 1961, the New Jersey Supreme Court brought attention to this vital, yet still relatively obscure, doctrine by applying it in a medical malpractice case. 93 Although the holding in that case expressly confined the discovery rule to foreign object malpractice actions, subsequent decisions have recognized the pertinence of the doctrine in a host of other contexts, including those in which the plaintiff remained ignorant of the entire cause of action. 94 With time, courts, led by the New Jersey Supreme Court, have recognized that a rule requiring reasonable diligence in attempting to locate stolen property is especially appropriate with respect to (7th Cir. 1986 With respect to stolen art, the use of the discovery rule has developed slowly. 98 In the few cases where courts have chosen to employ the discovery rule, they repeatedly have relied upon the 1980 case O'Keeffe v. Snyder 9 9 as authority for the doctrine's application. 1 0 0 In O'Keeffe, the renowned artist Georgia O'Keeffe alleged that in 1946, several of her paintings disappeared from a cooperative gallery exhibiting her work. 10 ' O'Keeffe never reported the disappearance to the local police department or any other law enforcement agency, never attempted to obtain a reimbursement from an insurance agency since she had not insured the paintings, nor advertised the loss in any publication.' 0 2 She did discuss it, however, with associates in the art world. instituted an action in replevin. 0 4 With 0'Keeffe, the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first court to adopt the discovery rule with respect to stolen art. 10 5 The court found that the introduction of equitable considerations through the discovery rule provided a more satisfactory response than adverse possession. 1 0 6 The rule would permit "an artist who use[d] reasonable efforts to report, investigate, and recover a painting to preserve the rights of title and possession." 10 7 The continued expansion of the discovery rule with regard to art theft has depended upon the New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion that the discovery rule more equitably responds to the problem of stolen art than previously employed doctrines.
Most recently, the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana followed the New Jersey Supreme Court's lead by applying the discovery rule to an action to recover stolen art. 109 The mosaics, created in the early sixth century, originally were part of a larger mosaic, affixed to the apse of the Church of the Panagia Kanakaria, depictingJesus as a young boy seated in the lap of the Virgin Mary. The large mosaic deteriorated over the centuries, so that all that remained were the four mosaics depicting the figure of Jesus and the busts of the North Archangel and two apostles. The court considered these mosaics of "invaluable and irreplaceable significance to Cyprus's [sic] In 1989, the Republic of Cyprus finally discovered that Peg Goldberg, of Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. in Indianapolis, Indiana, possessed the mosaics. 113 Goldberg, an art dealer who dealt almost exclusively in nineteenth and twentieth century works,"t 4 acquired the mosaics in Europe through a Dutch art dealer and a California attorney. 1 15 All the information Goldberg received regarding the mosaics came from these men. 1 6 These men told Goldberg that the seller supposedly found the mosaics in the rubble of an "extinct" church in northern Cyprus while serving there as a Turkish archaeologist.'
17
On Goldberg's request, the attorney met with the seller and determined that the mosaics had been properly exported from northern Cyprus.1 8 Goldberg then negotiated an agreement for the sale of the mosaics for $1.08 million, with the attorney and the art dealer serving as two of the three middlemen for the deal. 119 Goldberg then returned with the mosaics to the United States.' 20 When Goldberg refused their demand that she return the mosaics, the Republic of Cyprus and the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus instituted an action in replevin.' 2 1 Noting that the applicable limitations period was six years, the court concluded that its decision was not limited by a mechanical application of the statute of limitation bar. 12 2 Since Indiana recognized the use 112 Id. The Republic of Cyprus also sent a resolution to the Council of Europe, mailed letters, addressed symposia, congresses and other such meetings of scholars and artists, and sent press releases on a routine basis so that the information regarding the theft was disseminated to journalists, Congressmen, legislative assistants, and individuals in academia and archaeology with an interest in Greek and Cypriot affairs. Id-Goldberg worked with the Dutch art dealer even though she had been told that the dealer once had been convicted for forging Marc Chagall's signature and that he also had been sued by an art gallery for failing to fulfill an obligation. Goldberg also knew that the California attorney represented both the Dutch art dealer and the art dealer, with whom she was acquainted from Indianapolis, who introduced her to these men. of the discovery rule in other contexts, the court applied this rule to the facts of the case. 123 The court determined that the Republic of Cyprus and the church had exercised due diligence in their search to locate and recover the mosaics' 2 4 and that they did not know and reasonably could not have known the whereabouts of the mosaics or the identity of the possessor of the mosaics until 1988.125 Therefore, since the action accrued in 1988 and the Church and the Republic filed their claim in 1989, the claim fell within the six year statute of limitations. 1 2 6 The recent adherence of the Indiana District Court in Autocephaous to the discovery rule demonstrates the grasp that this doctrine presently holds on the judiciary when addressing limitations periods for the recovery of stolen art. At the same time, this case suggests the need to reevaluate the discovery rule. Indeed, one must question whether the discovery rule's sole focus upon the original owner's actions constitutes the most equitable and efficient method for determining his right to bring an action to recover stolen property. 12 7
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. APPARENT ADVANTAGES OF THE DISCOVERY RULE OVER RECENTLY-ESPOUSED DOCTRINES
Since the recognition of the inherent dangers of mechanically applying statute of limitation bars, courts have searched for an ap-propriate corollary doctrine to determine whether owners can bring actions against subsequent bona fide purchasers to recover stolen art. 1 28 The use of the currently espoused doctrine, the discovery rule, appears at first glance to impede this undesirable result more effectively than previously employed corollary doctrines such as adverse possession and the demand and refusal rule. Unlike these prior doctrines, the discovery rule allegedly attaches equitable considerations to the statute of limitations defense by shifting the emphasis from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the owner. This shift assures that the law does not frustrate the attempts by the owner to recover stolen art, while still discouraging the trafficking of stolen art.' 29 Proponents of the discovery rule assert that the shift in emphasis from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the owner plays a vital role in differentiating the discovery rule from the previously employed adverse possession doctrine and the demand and refusal rule. Adverse possession's focus favors the possessor, because it potentially allows a possessor to obtain tide to an art object merely because the owner's attempts to recover it have been fruitless during the limitations period. Conversely, the discovery rule allegedly recognizes that courts should not necessarily bar an individual kept ignorant of the location of her stolen artwork or the identity of its possessor from asserting a claim.' 3 0 By focusing on the actions of the owner, rather than on those of the possessor, advocates of the discovery rule claim that the doctrine protects innocent victims by allowing them to retain title to their stolen property as long as they take appropriate steps to recover it.
Similarly, proponents assert that the discovery rule's shift in emphasis better protects innocent victims than the demand and refusal rule. Although the demand and refusal rule does not focus solely upon the actions of the possessor, it centers on the occurrence of a particular, arbitrary event.' 3 ' Thus, like the adverse pos- 131 It has been suggested that the event required for an action to recover stolen property to accrue should not be the original owner's demand that the subsequent possessor return his stolen property, but instead should be the time when the owner had the right to make such a demand. See Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 32, at 1136. This interpretation of the demand requirement also unduly favors the purchaser of stolen art. session doctrine, the demand and refusal rule ignores the original owner's attempts to recover his stolen property. In fact, the demand and refusal rule may encourage possessors to take greater steps to conceal such property, because concealment further impedes the owner's ability to locate the stolen object and thus demand its return.
Proponents of the discovery rule emphasize that such concealment does not handicap the possessor's title claim. Unlike the adverse possession doctrine, under the discovery rule the possessor does not need to fulfill a requirement of open and notorious possession. The discovery rule does not rely upon an arbitrary event to establish an owner's right to bring an action in replevin. Since it varies with the facts of each case, defenders of the discovery rule assert that the doctrine does not encourage possessors to conceal art objects and gives owners an opportunity to protect their title through the exercise of due diligence.
32
Proponents also have claimed that the discovery rule actively pursues an equitable solution to the conflict between an owner's right to recover his stolen property and a possessor's right to repose through a more comprehensive inquiry into the facts of each case. Because adverse possession only requires an inquiry into the defendant's possession, it ignores the possibility that the plaintiff attempted to recover his property or failed to pursue productive avenues of recovery.' 3 3 Moreover, adverse possession requires that the defendant prove all of the elements of adverse possession, even though a substantial lapse of time may have impaired his ability to gather and produce the necessary evidence. I3 4 Thus, while adverse possession does not afford a plaintiff the opportunity to take helpful steps to protect his or her title to a stolen art object, the doctrine's narrow scope of inquiry also may prevent a defendant from presenting conclusive evidence of his or her right to title.
Similarly, the demand and refusal rule suffers from a narrow scope of inquiry. The only factor relevant to a court's determination of whether an owner can bring an action against a subsequent purchaser of his stolen property is the arbitrary time when the owner demands that the possessor return that property. While the the art world and the sophistication, which the Second Circuit imputed to DeWeerth, to at least contact the police. Yet for no discernable reason, the New Jersey Supreme Court chose not to impose such a duty upon O'Keeffe.
This lack of clarity and consistency among the various jurisdictions places owners and possessors of stolen art in precarious positions. To protect her property, an owner may tend to overcompensate by taking excessive investigatory measures. This behavior may result in unreasonable expenditures, which would place a tremendous financial burden on the owner. An owner then would have to chose between spending vast sums of money conducting a "diligent" search, or forgoing this expense and giving up the hope of recovering her stolen property. Requiring an innocent victim of art theft to make such a choice hardly comports with the discovery rule's intention to provide an equitable solution.
The discovery rule places a possessor in an equally precarious position because he cannot control an owner's fulfillment of the due diligence requirement. An owner automatically can fulfill the due diligence requirement by taking excessive investigatory steps. If the owner takes such steps, the possessor has no way to counter the owner's actions and thus retain the item at issue.
Given the possessor's vulnerability to a discovery rule claim, his best method of assuring continued dominion over an art object is to conceal it so that no one has the opportunity to recognize the art object as stolen. This concealment problem actually parallels the concealment problem fostered by the demand and refusal rule, which the discovery rule ironically attempts to circumvent. As under the demand and refusal rule, the possessor's lack of control over the owner's ability to fulfill the requirements to bring an action in replevin may motivate him to take extra steps to impede the owner's ability to locate his stolen property. Thus, an owner's burden of demonstrating a "diligent" effort to recover his property may create the anomalous result of forcing an owner to choose between taking excessive investigatory measures or giving up her claim to her stolen property; similarly, it may encourage a possessor to conceal art objects from the public.
Indeed, the discovery rule fails to promote an equitable method for addressing the issue of the recovery of stolen art for the same reason that the previous doctrines failed: the discovery rule favors one litigating party at the expense of the other. Courts have wrestled with the question of which party's actions to focus upon since their decision that the application of the statute of limitations provided too arbitrary a solution to the dilemma of whether owners can
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bring action against subsequent purchasers for the recovery of stolen property. Thus far, the courts have changed their opinion from focusing on the possessor under the adverse possession doctrine to focusing on the owner under the discovery rule. Yet, no strong policy reason exists to favor either the owner or the possessor. As much as the courts wish to protect owners against art theft, the courts also do not wish to discourage individuals from trading and buying art.
To deter such unwarranted favoritism of either owners or bona fide purchasers of stolen art objects, courts should establish clearer, more objective measures for determining whether an owner can bring an action to recover stolen property from a subsequent purchaser. By relying upon more objective standards, rather than the subjective standards currently relied upon, parties can tailor their actions in accordance with the courts' expectations. Thus, an original owner will know how to fulfill her obligation to diligently search for stolen property, and a subsequent purchaser will know how to take precautions against buying stolen art objects.
One might argue that the courts may encounter difficulties in establishing more objective standards, because the facts of each case vary widely. Nonetheless, courts at least can establish objective guidelines which vary in stringency according the nature and the value of the property. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in O'Keeffe:
[w]ith respect to jewelry of moderate value, it may be sufficient if the owner reports the theft to the police. With respect to art work of greater value, it may be reasonable to expect an owner to do more. In practice, our ruling should contribute to more careful practices concerning the purchase of art.
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The use of such guidelines would fulfill the dual goals of providing objective standards upon which parties can rely while still allowing leeway for the resolution of a broad range of case scenarios. The most significant objective requirement which courts should consider is whether potential plaintiffs have contacted law enforcement agencies and art foundations which investigate and disseminate information on art thefts. Unfortunately, law enforcement efforts to handle art theft cases have been regarded as fragmentary and underdeveloped.
14 7 Similarly, art foundations which collect and disseminate information on art theft have been considered un-
